Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Equivalence: Relation between sentences. It exists if both sides have the same truth value, so that they are both true or both false.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Equivalence - Dictionary of Arguments

VI 76
Cognitive Equivalence: is the replacement of a sentence by another. One should not interfere with the empirical content. QuineVs: this is not sure because a representative function is possible - instead: synonymy of stimuly - (but this is only for occasion sentences). Afterwards cognitive synonymy is possible also for terms but not for timeless sentences.
X 21ff
Sentence Equivalence/QuineVs: in everyday language there is no basic order (like pixels in a photo) - you cannot assign the sensual proof clearly to individual sentences ((s) formulations) - Quine: Because of the network of theories - (>underdetermination of empiricism
).
II 66
Sentence Equivalence: when are two sentences considered equivalent? Frequent answer: if their use is the same! Or, if the stimuli are the same. Obviously it does not work that way! The two sentences cannot be uttered at the same time. The utterance of one must exclude that of the other! Moreover, at every opportunity when one of the two possible sentences has been uttered, there must be a reason, however trivial, for the utterance of one instead of the other!
We are obviously asking too much when we are asking for all the irritations in question to be identical. In any case, one criterion would be illusory in practice if it demanded that the stimulus conditions are actually being compared.
All in all, statements are practically unpredictable. The motives for the utterance of a sentence can vary inscrutably. Solution/Quine: >Cognitive Equivalence:
II 67
Cognitive Equivalence: here we are spared speculations about motives and circumstances. Instead, we can arrange circumstances and say sentences ourselves. If you make a mistake with your verdicts, it does not matter, you will make a mistake with both sentences.
II 68
Def Cognitive Equivalence: two occasional sentences are cognitively equivalent if they cause consent or rejection on every occasion.
>Cognition/Quine.
II 45ff
Empirical equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation. Both theories are true, but may be logically incompatible.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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