Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
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Abstract: non-representational - abstract concept, expression of something non-objective - how to demarcate from concrete objects? How to differentiate between abstract entities and concepts, ultimately words._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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David K. Lewis on Abstractness - Dictionary of Arguments
V 20 Abstract entities/possible world/Lewis: abstract entities do not live in certain possible worlds. They exist simultaneously in all of them. Properties/Lewis: (2004, 4): at least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, so "round" is not generally a relation to times. --- Schwarz I 42 Def Surrogate Four-Dimensionalism/Schwarz: this position in the philosophy of time interprets other times as abstract entities of a different kind from the present. LewisVs: other times are just as real. Lewis doesn't care if you call his worlds concrete or abstract. This has no clear meaning (1986e(1), §1,7). Schwarz I 43 Ontology/Lewis: Lewis compares his position with the platonism of mathematics: beyond ordinary things there are abstract objects. For these, however, we do not need supernatural cognitive powers. >Possible Worlds/Plantinga. 1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |