Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Pointing: The problem with pointing is that it is difficult to know exactly what the pointer is trying to indicate. Additionally, pointing is often context-dependent, so it can be difficult to know what someone is pointing to without knowing more about the situation. see also Definition, Definability, Ostension, Ostensive definition, Ambiguity, Rule following._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Pointing - Dictionary of Arguments
V 70f Pointing/indicative/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: how do we know which part of the area is meant, how do we recognize pointing as such. Solution: Sorting out the irrelevant by induction. Also amplification without a pointing finger or deletions with pointing finger. X 24 Indicative Pointing/Ostension/Language Learning/Quine: both the learner and the teacher must understand the appropriateness of the situation. This leads to a uniformity of response to certain stimuli. This uniformity is a behavioural criterion for what should become an observation sentence. It also makes it possible for different scientists to check the evidence for each other. >Language Learning/Quine, >Stimuli/Quine, >Observation Sentences/Quine. XI 182 Note: Pointing/indicative/Ostension/Quine/Lauener: difference: between direct and shifted ostension: Def shifted Ostension/Quine/Lauener: if we refer to a green leaf to explain the abstract singular term "green", we do not mean the perceptible green thing, because the word does not denote a concrete entity. >Ostension/Quine. XII 47 Pointing/Ostension/Color Words/Gavagai/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: for example the color word "sepia": can be learned by conditioning or induction. It does not even need to be said that sepia is a color and not a form, a material or a commodity. However, it may be that many lessons are necessary. >Colour/Quine. XII 56 Def Direct Ostension/Pointing/Quine: the point shown is at the end of a straight line on an opaque surface. Problem: how much of the environment should count? Problem: how far may an absent thing differ from the object shown to fall under the term declared ostensively? XII 57 Def Shifted Ostension/Pointing/Quine: For example, pointing to the fuel gauge instead of the fuel itself to indicate how much is still there. ((s) But not that the fuel gauge is still there). Example shifted: if we point to an event (token) and mean the type. E.g. pointing to grass to explain green. For example, point to an inscription to explain a letter. Double shifted: e.g. Goedel number for an expression. (1st inscription of the formula (of the expression), 2nd Goedel number as proxy for it). XII 58 The shifted ostension does not cause any problems that are not already present in the direct version. VII (d) 67 Pointing/indicating definition/Ostension/Identity/Quine: is always ambiguous because of the temporal extension! Our setting of an object does not tell us yet which summation of current objects is intended! When pointing again either the river or river stages can be meant! Therefore, pointing is usually accompanied by pronouncing the words "this river". But this presupposes a concept of river. "This river" means: "the river-like summation of momentary objects that this momentary object contains". VII (d) 68 Pointing/Ostension/Quine: the spatial extension cannot be separated from the temporal extension when pointing, because we ourselves need time for pointing at different places. VII (d) 74 Ostension/Pointing/objects/universals/Quine: how does pointing to space-time objects differ from pointing to universals like square and triangle? VII (d) 75 Square: each time we point to different objects and do not assume an identity from one opportunity to another. The river, on the other hand, assumes this identity. Attribute/Quine: the "squareness" is divided by the shown objects. But you do not need to assume entities like "attributes". Neither the "squareness" is pointed to, nor is it needed for a reference to the word "square". The expression "is square" is also not necessary if the listener learns when to use it and when not to use it. The expression does not need to be a name for any detached object. VII (d) 76 Pointing/concrete/abstract/Quine: general terms like "square" are very similar to concrete singular terms like "Cayster" (the name of the river) concerning the east version. With "red" you do not need to make a distinction at all! VII (d) 77 In everyday language, a general term is often used like a proper name. >General Terms/Quine. V 70 Pointing/Quine: is useful to introduce the anomaly. Conspicuousness/Quine/(s): should explain why from the multitude of stimuli certain stimuli are overweighted or how shapes are recognized against a background. V 89 Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then you could still ask. "The same what? V 102 Pointing/General Terms/Quine: Problem: unique showing requires special care in some situations. Example "this body is an animal": here the outline must be carefully traced, otherwise it could be that only the hull is perceived as an animal. V 103 At the beginning we did not talk about sentences like "This body is Mama", because we have to assume a general mastery of the "is" in the predication of duration. This requires a stock of individually learned examples._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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