|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Pauen I 244
I/Ego/Blackmore/Pauen: Blackmore thesis: Beliefs are only accumulations of memes that change constantly. VsMinsky, VsDennett: The self also has no pragmatic value. >Memes.
Unencumbered by it, we can have an unbiased access to the present. (Th. NagelVs.)
I: the I is not the origin of our desires, but the function of bundling.
PauenVsBlackmore: how should continuity be preserved at all? >Personal identity.
Vs: Individuals can behave very differently to desires, even if they belong to the same social group._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Consciousness London 2010
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001