|Kosslyn I 253
Imagination/Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs figurative imaginations as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation.
Imagination, figurative/Kosslyn: Question: do they differ in structure and function from other imaginations?
Kosslyn I 253
Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images.
There are no incomplete imaginations, for example, that half a sofa is missing.
However, it would take too much storage capacity to store all the information from the retina.
Kosslyn I 256
Furthermore, there would be no practicable access if all of them were stored.
So there must be some interpretation after all.
Figurative ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions).
Imagination/figurative/Kosslyn: the mere having does not imply that there is a causal role here.
Kosslyn I 260
Proposition: Our perception consists of parts that are assigned to objects.
KosslynVsPylyshyn: we have imagination images. Even if they're not scanned internally.
If the images are stored uninterpreted, not too much time is required to access them._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Zenon W. Pylyshyn
Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World Cambrindge, MA 2011
Stephen M. Kosslyn
James R. Pomerantz
"Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992