Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Hedonism: hedonism is interpreted in the tradition in two ways a) as the view that the only intrinsic good is the feeling of something pleasurable, or b) as the psychological thesis that pleasure is the only thing that individuals strive for. (J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice Original Edition Oxford 2005, p. 554).
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

John Rawls on Hedonism - Dictionary of Arguments

I 554
Def Hedonism/Rawls: in tradition, hedonism is interpreted in two ways: a) as the view that the only intrinsic good is the feeling of something pleasant, or b) as the psychological thesis that enjoyment is the only thing that individuals aspire to.
I 557
Rawls: I see hedonism as an attempt to impose the concept of the ultimate goal, i.e. to show that a rational decision is always possible, at least in principle. Although this attempt fails, it is worthwhile to show the difference between utilitarianism and contract theory in his example.
>Rationality
, >Utilitarianism, >Contract Theory.
Hedonism/Rawls: therefore assumes that there must be an ultimate goal, because there is no rational way of weighing equal goals against each other. For him, enjoyment is simply a pleasant feeling and thus the only candidate for a superordinate goal, by eliminating competing goals, not by a principle. If there are rational choices, there must be a supreme goal and happiness or another objective goal cannot be it because that would be circular(1).
>Goals, >Purposes.
I 556
Hedonism/Sidgwick/Rawls: even if too little information is available, maximum pleasure conveys an idea of good. For Sidgwick, this is sufficient to ensure that pleasure as a rational goal is an orientation of thought(2).
RawlsVsHedonism: he fails to define a reasonable superordinate goal, because once the pleasure is described in sufficient detail,...
I 557
...so that it can be included in the rational considerations of the actor, it is no longer plausible that it should be the sole rational objective(3).
((s) Explanation: For example, when it comes to experiencing the birth of a grandchild, there must be a superordinate goal, namely to live for so long. If the acting person is asked what is more important to him, his own life or the life of the grandchild, he will probably give up his hedonism.)
Pleasure/Sidgwick/RawlsVsSidgwick/Rawls: it is difficult for him to weigh up and evaluate different forms of pleasure against each other(4).
>H. Sidgwick.
Pleasure/Aristotle/Rawls: Aristotle says that a good person gives up his life for a friend if necessary, on the grounds that he prefers a short period of intense pleasure to a long, dull life(5).
Santayana/Rawls: means that we have to weigh up the relative value of pleasure and pain against each other.
>The Good/Aristotle.
Petrarca/Santayana/Rawls: when Petrarca says that a thousand pleasures cannot outweigh a single pain, he adopts a yardstick that goes back beyond both possibilities. The acting person must involve his whole life in the weighing process. So the problem of multiplicity of purposes comes back(6).
I 558
Economic theory/demand theory/Rawls: It is a misunderstanding that in modern economic theory, e. g. demand theory, the problem of hedonism would be solved. Here, needs are arranged convexly and completely as a set of alternatives. Then there is a utility function that selects the best alternative for an individual.
RawlsVs: however, this can only be taken as a guideline if an individual wishes to adhere to it. But then we have returned to the issue of rational choice(7)(8)(9).
>Rational Choice.

1. See C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London, 1930).
2. See H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London, 1907), pp. 405-407.
3. Cf. Broad, p. 187.
4. Sidgwick, p. 127.
5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1169a17-26.
6. G. Santayana, The Life of Reason in Common Sense (New York, 1905) pp. 237f.
7. See L. Walras, Elements of Pure Economics, Homewood, Ill, 1954, p. 256.
8. P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, 1947), pp. 90-92.
9. R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York, 1957), pp. 16, 21-24, 38.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005


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