Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intuitionism: A) intuitionism in mathematics assumes that the objects to be inspected, e.g. numbers are only constructed in the process of the investigation and are therefore not ready objects, which are discovered. This has an effect on the double negation and the sentence of the excluded middle. B) Intuitionism of ethics assumes that moral principles are fixed and are immediately (or intuitively) knowable. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Paul Lorenzen on Intuitionism - Dictionary of Arguments
Berka I 269 Intuitionist/classical logic/Lorenzen: If the intuitionist logic has been constructively justified in this way, the interpretation of the classical logic is, for example, by means of the elimination of v,>, universal quantification is no longer a problem. >Universal quantification, >Logical connectives, >Logical constants. Quantification: however, the use of quantifiers is bound to the condition that the assertions that an element belongs to a quantified variable already have a dialogically definite meaning.(1) >Dialogical logic, >Quantifiers, >Domains. 1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
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> Counter arguments against Lorenzen
> Counter arguments in relation to Intuitionism
