Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intensional objects: intensional objects are objects of thought which may or may not correspond to external objects. Properties can be attributed to these objects, which cannot be attributed in any case to external objects. For example, dreamed things and situations with physically impossible properties. A fundamental problem is that in every discussion it must be ensured that the objects which can be disputed are not only intensional. A special problem is the status of intensional objects to which the object character is denied. See also mentalism, intensions, thought objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Steven E. Boer on Intensional Objects - Dictionary of Arguments
I XIV Direct objects/direct object/propositional attitudes/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis. Fulfillment conditions/EB/propositional attitudes/Individuation/Boer: N.B.: The conditions of fulfillment do not seem to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude. On the other hand: Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude. Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs. Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: In order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience. Definition reference/terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then be only a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. Thought object/Tradition/Boer: Thought objects are often understood in the tradition as the thought content of a propositional attitude with all involved objects: BoerVs: confusion of thinking-that with thinking-about. --- I XV Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain. Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only that/these item/s to which a subject refers to by the power of ψ. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves! Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ). That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content). Content/Thought content/Boer: is the that-Satz. Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
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> Counter arguments against Boer
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensional Objects
