Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
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Truth Predicate: the truth predicate of a language is the "is true" expressed in this language. Its allowance can be empirically justified or attributed to the statement on the basis of the logical form. According to the redundancy theory, the truth-predicate is fundamentally superfluous. According to W.V.O. Quine (Quine, Philosophie der Logik, 2005, p. 33), the truth predicate is merely used for generalization. For example, all sentences of a particular form are true. A language containing its own truth-predicate is semantically closed. In such a language, semantic paradoxes are possible. See also expressiveness, circularity, semantic closeness, truth, truth definition, redundancy theory, self-reference, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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James F. Thomson on Truth Predicate - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 164 True/Tarski/Thomson: is essential, as long as we do not know the setntence of the object language. >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Truth. "True" allows us to ask questions about sentences that we have not yet specified or that are unspecifiable. >Sentences, >Propositions. E.g. Smith’s theory about dogs - if we can list a theory in sentences, we can "true" eliminate. ((s)> Quine, T-predicate for generalization). >Lists, >Truth/Quine, >Generalization/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
ThomsonJF I James F. Thomson "A Note on Truth", Analysis 9, (1949), pp. 67-72 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 ThomsonJJ I Judith J. Thomson Goodness and Advice Princeton 2003 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |