Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth conditions: the conditions under which statements, propositions, assertions, etc. are true are called truth conditions. In order to understand a sentence, according to some theories, it is sufficient to know its truth conditions. (Compare M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt, 1992, p. 20). According to these theories, one can understand not only true but also false sentences. See also semantics, sentence meaning, understanding, truth, meaning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Nicholas Rescher on Truth Conditions - Dictionary of Arguments
In: Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 I 342 Truth conditions/Tarski: The condition does not provide a definition of truth at all, but an adequacy criterion. - ((s) Truth conditions alternate with propositions and facts). >Adequacy, >Criteria, >Truth, >Facts, >Propositions. Definition of truth/Rescher: We rather need "that-p is true gdw. p" than the original schema "x is true gdw. p". >Disquotation, >Disquotational scheme. Quine/Church: X believes "there are unicorns" is not equivalent to "X believes the proposition that there are unicorns is true in German". >Equivalence. At most systematic correspondence of truth values - language dependence of truth. ((s) Other authors: criterion not equal to condition.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Conditions
