Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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The Good: The word "good" can have many different applications, but in general it refers to something that is morally right, ethical, or beneficial. It can also be used to describe something that is pleasant, desirable, or enjoyable. Philosophy is particularly concerned with the difficulties of defining the good. See also Definitions, Definability.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

John Rawls on Good - Dictionary of Arguments

I 396
Good/The Good/Goodness/being good/Justice/Rawls: we must distinguish between two theories of good, since in the theory of justice as fairness the concept of law precedes that of good. In contrast to teleological theory, something is only good if it can be integrated into existing principles. On the other hand, you need a concept of good to establish the principles, because you have to take into account the motives of those involved. In order not to jeopardise the primacy of the concept of law, the concept of good can only be reduced to the essentials here. That's what I call the Thin Theory of the good.
I 397
Rationality: does not require the disposition of all knowledge. I suppose that rational actors are more likely to choose more than less primary public goods.
>Public Goods/Rawls
, >Rationality.
In the initial situation of a society to be established, the participants assume that their ideas of good have a certain structure.
The concept of good is later used in connection with the moral value of persons.
I 398
In a well-ordered, approximately fair society it will turn that it is good in itself to be a good person. For this, however, we need a theory of good that presupposes the principles of justice. If the sense of justice itself is a good one, then only in the sense of the Thin Theory.
I 399
In this case, the sense of justice contributes to the stability of an orderly society. I call this accordance of goodness and justice congruence.
Def Good/The Good/Rawls: I assume the following for a definition.
1. a thing A is a good X if it has a certain property to a greater extent than something else, average(1).
2. A is a good X for a person K exactly when A has the characteristics that make it rational for K to aim for X.
3. K's life plan has to be rational on the whole.
I 400
See footnotes 2-15.
I 423
Being Good/Goodness as Rationality/Rawls: (See Planning/Rawls): One might think that it is necessary for the individual to constantly raisonninate to explore whether his/her plans are rational. This is a misunderstanding. Ultimately, it's about finding a criterion for the value of a person. This is mainly defined by reference to a rational (hypothetical) plan.
>Rationality.
I 424
However, we cannot infer from the definition of a rational plan the content of objectives. There are human needs in general, plans have to take into account human skills and social dependencies, etc.
I 426
Def Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities, and all the more so the more they realize these abilities and the more complex they are(16)(17)(18)(19).
>ceteris paribus, >Aristotle.
I 429
Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice.
I 431
VsRawls: Why should the Aristotelian Principle be true - RawlsVsVs: we observe it on children and higher animals. It also seems to be possible to explain it with evolutionary theory. The selection will have selected the individuals to whom it applies(20)(21)(22).
I 435
In order to make the Thin Theory a fully-fledged one that is about the value of a person, we ask how fellow citizens judge other fellow citizens who are in the same position. This involves average skills in an average position and in different roles, especially those that are considered more important. In addition, we assume broad characteristics that are normally sought by rational persons. (The indication of broad properties comes from T. M. Scanlon).
>T.M. Scanlon.
I 437
Def good person/Def moral value/Rawls: a person of moral value is then an individual with an above-average degree of broad moral qualities, so that it is rational for individuals in the initial situation of a society to be established to strive for this for themselves and for each other.
N.B.: no additional ethical concepts are introduced.
>Values, >Morals.
Person/HareVsRawls: some authors have argued that a person qua person has no defined role or function if he/she is not treated as an instrument or object, so this definition of goodness or rationality would also have to fail(23).
>R. M. Hare.
I 438
RawlsVsHare/RawlsVsVs: we do not have to assume that people have a certain role and even less that they should serve as a means to higher purposes. We only refer to the initial situation of a society to be established.
I 446
Good/The Good/The Right/Rightness/Rawls: how does the Good differ from the Right? 1. The principles of justice that are used for the purpose of determining the good are principles that are chosen in the initial situation of a society to be established. On the other hand, the principles of rational decision and rationality used to determine the right thing are not chosen.
>Principles/Rawls.
I 447
Another difference is that people differ in what is considered good, but not so in the case of determining the right thing.

1. See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford 1930), p. 67.
2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, vk. III, ch. 1-63.
3. Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Acadmy Edition, vol. IV, pp. 425-419; The Critique of Practical Reason, ch. II, bk I of pt. I.
4. See H. J. Paton on Kant in: In Defense of Reason (London, 1951), pp. 157-177.
5. H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th Ed.(London, 1907), bk. I, ch. IX and bk. III, ch. XIV.
6. F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd Ed. (Oxford, 1926), ch. II.
7. Joshua Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York, 1908), lext II.
8. H. J. Paton, The Good Will (London, 1927), bk. II and III, esp. ch. VIII and IX.
9. W.D. Lamont, The Value Judgment (Edingurgh, 1955).
10. J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions (London, 1961) ch. V, secs I and III; ch. VI.
(11. For the naturalistic value theory see: John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), pt. III.
12. See also R. B: Perry, General Theory of Value (New York, 1926), ch. XX-XXII.
13. As well as C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Lasalle Ill. 1946), bk. III.
14. Rawls' own approach is based on: J. O. Urmson „On Grading“, Mind (1950), vol. 59, Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, NY, 1960), ch. VI.
15. Philippa Foot, „Goodness and Choice“, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 35 (1961).
16. Cf. Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, ch. 11-14, bk. X. ch. 1-5.
17. See W.F.R. Hardie, Aristote’s Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV.
18. G.C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp. 76-78.
19. R. W. White, „Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory“,Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175, 180f.
20. See B. G. Campbell, Human Evolution (Chicago, 1966), pp. 49-53.
21. W. H. Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, (London, 1965), pp. 87-92.
22. I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Ethology (New York, 1970), pp. 217-248.
23. See R. M. Hare, Geach on Good an Evil, Analysis 17(5), p. 109ff.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005


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