Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sanctions history: The history of economic sanctions dates back to ancient times, with the Megarian Decree (432 BC) being one of the earliest recorded instances. While often used in warfare historically, their prominence grew in the 20th century with organizations like the League of Nations and United Nations. Initially, broad, country-based sanctions were common, but concerns about humanitarian impact led to the rise of "targeted" or "smart" sanctions in the 21st century. See also Sanctions, Sanctions effectiveness, Sanctions debate, Sanctions consequences, Sanctions objectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Constantinos Syropoulos on Sanctions History - Dictionary of Arguments
Morgan I 5 Sanctions History/Morgan/Syropoulos/Yotov: (…) contemporary sanctions policies are quite different from those adopted in earlier decades. Recent uses emphasize, to a much greater extent, the necessity of designing sanctions to target key individuals, companies, or sectors (for example, “smart” or “targeted” sanctions including financial and travel sanctions) rather than using sanctions as a blunt instrument designed to harm the entire target nation (for example, trade sanctions). Problem: Our theoretical and empirical understanding of sanctions has not kept up with these changes. (…) debates over the merits of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy have existed for at least 2,500 years. Morgan I 6 One of the first (if not the first) recorded instance of economic sanctions can be found in the Megarian Decree (circa BCE 432), by which Athens barred trade with Megara and denied the Megarians access to Athenian ports. Ostensibly, this action was taken as a diplomatic measure against the Megarians for having cultivated Athenian land and killing an Athenian herald. The Megarian Decree is viewed by many as a trigger, if not a major cause, of the Peloponnesian War that followed. One view is that these sanctions were a way of imposing costs on the Megarians without having to resort to war, in which case the sanctions failed to achieve their goal. On the other side, many believe that Pericles persuaded the Athenians to adopt the Megarian Decree precisely because he intended to foment war (Kagan 1969(1); MacDonald 1983(2)), in which case they would count as a success in achieving a dubious goal. In the aftermath of World War I, there was broad interest in the use of economic sanctions as an alternative to war. However, the two best-known examples of sanctions from this time had questionable results as well. In one example, the League of Nations imposed sanctions on Italy in 1935 in response to its invasion of the Abyssinia region of Ethiopia. At that time, however, Italy was viewed as a counterweight for Nazi expansionism in Germany, which made countries like Great Britain and France unwilling to administer such sanctions. Ultimately, these sanctions are deemed to have been a colossal failure that undermined the standing of the League. In the second example, the United States imposed severe trade restrictions on Japan to discourage Japanese military conquests in East Asia. Instead, these sanctions contributed to the Japanese decision to widen the war by attacking Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Boudreau 1997(3); Hosoya 1968(4); Russett 1967(5)) - another case of sanctions preceding military conflict, rather than being substituted for it. The dramatic increase in the use of sanctions in recent decades is the result of a steady acceleration that began after World War II. There have also been significant changes in the purposes to which sanctions have been applied, in the types of sanctions used, and in the international actors who have imposed sanctions. Early Cold War: 1950 - 75 During this period, close to one-third of the implemented sanctions were imposed by the United States acting unilaterally. Because the United States also played a key role in many of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and by ad hoc multilateral coalitions, it was, by far, the most prolific sanctioner and thus largely responsible for the expansion in the use of sanctions. About 60 percent of the sanctions in the early 1950s were trade and arms embargoes. These sanctions were most commonly applied to destabilize political regimes or to influence the Morgan I 7 During this period, the recent experience of World War II reinforced the desire for an alternative to military force. Hirschman’s seminal National Power and the Structure of International Trade (1945)(6) provided the theoretical basis for believing sanctions could provide that alternative. Morgan I 8 Hirschman argued that trade significantly improves economic well-being for all, but that it also creates asymmetrical power relationships; that is, when states are interdependent through commerce, the less dependent nation may use restrictive trade policies to enhance its power by gaining leverage in disputes over other issues. Morgan I 9 (…) soon after the end of World War II, the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States became the defining feature of international politics, and the United States frequently used sanctions in support of its Cold War policies (Barber 1979)(7). Late Cold War: 1975–1990 By the early 1970s, Western Europe and Japan had largely recovered from World War II and began to challenge the economic hegemony of the United States (Blum 2003(8); Mastanduno 2019(9)). What was then called the European Economic Community (EEC) was beginning to realize its promise of allowing its members to act with a single voice. Although the United States remained the single largest economy in the global system, a number of economic “shocks” (such as the unilateral decision by President Richard Nixon to allow the exchange rate of the US dollar to float and the OPEC oil embargo of 1974–1975, which led to higher oil prices that buttressed Soviet power and likely to increased aggressiveness elsewhere in the world) highlighted the United States’s growing vulnerabilities. Politically, the United States was weakened by its long and unsuccessful war in Vietnam. The US public was less willing to use military force and the United States had lost some of its standing as a proponent of democratic values and human rights (Eichenberg 2005(10); Jentleson and Britton 1998)(11). Morgan I 10 Post-Cold War: 1990–2000 In the 1990s, a great hope emerged that the global polity was on the brink of a “New World Order” in which democracy and liberal economic relationships would spread, interstate war would be (largely) a thing of the past, and international organizations would manage conflict and structure cooperation (Barnett 1997)(12). In the early 1990s, the Cold War came to an abrupt end with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a wave of democratization swept much of the globe. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was met by an unprecedented level of international cooperation, which increased the esteem and strengthened the position of multilateralism, especially through international organizations such as the United Nations. The United States adopted the policy of fully incorporating China in the international economic system (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990(13)). On the economic side, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which created the European Union, set Europe on the path of even greater economic coordination. In 1995, the World Trade Organization superseded the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), regularizing trade relationships even further, but also making it more difficult to apply trade sanctions (Charnovitz 2001(14); Mitchell 2017)(15) Morgan I 11 Post-9/11: 2001–Present The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States unleashed two decades of war. This period also witnessed a turn away from democratization and a turn toward nationalism. More recently, the world has also experienced major economic upheaval following the financial crisis of 2008 and the global pandemic. Once again, we are experiencing an interstate war in Europe, which has triggered the most substantial sanctions ever imposed on a relatively strong economic power. >Sanctions, >Sanctions consequences, >Sanctions debate, >Sanctions effectiveness, >Sanctions evasion, >Sanctions history, >Sanctions policies, >Sanctions theory, >Trade sanctions, >Financial sanctions. 1. Kagan, Donald. 1969. The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2. MacDonald, Brian R. 1983. “The Megarian Decree.” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 32 (4): 385–410. 3. Boudreau, Donald G. 1997. “Economic Sanctions and Military Force in the Twenty‐First Century.” European Security 6 (2): 28–46. 4. Hosoya, Chihiro. 1968. “Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938–1941.” Journal of Peace Research 5 (2): 97–115. 5. Russett, Bruce M. 1967. International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology. 6. Hirschman, Albert O. 1945. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 7. Barber, James. 1979. “Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument.” International Affairs 55 (3): 367–84. 8. Blum, Samantha. 2003. “Chinese Views of US Hegemony.” Journal of Contemporary China 12 (35): 239–64. 9. Mastanduno, Michael. 2019. “Liberal Hegemony, International Order, and US Foreign Policy: A Reconsideration.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 21 (1): 47–54. 10. Eichenberg, Richard C. 2005. “Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981–2005.” International Security 30 (1): 140–77. 11. Jentleson, Bruce W., and Rebecca L. Britton. 1998. “Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (4): 395–417. 12. Barnett, Michael N. 1997. “Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations.” World Politics 49 (4): 526–51. 13. Jacobson, Harold K., and Michel Oksenberg. 1990. China’s Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 14. Charnovitz, Steve. 2001. “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions.” American Journal of International Law 95 (4): 792–832. 15. Mitchell, Andrew D. 2017. “Sanctions and the World Trade Organization.” In Research Handbook on UN Sanctions and International Law, edited by Larissa van den Herik, 283–303. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Syropoulos, Constantinos Morgan I T. Clifton Morgan Constantinos Syropoulos Yoto V. Yotov, "Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges." Journal of Economic Perspectives 37 (1): 3–30. 2023 |
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