Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sanctions policies: Sanctions policies in economics refer to the deliberate design and implementation of economic restrictions by governments or international bodies. These policies aim to influence a target's behavior—such as a country, entity, or individual—by imposing economic costs. They encompass various tools like trade bans, financial asset freezes, and restrictions on aid, serving as a non-military foreign policy instrument. See also Sanctions, Sanctions effectiveness, Sanctions debate, Sanctions consequences, Sanctions objectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Constantinos Syropoulos on Sanctions Policies - Dictionary of Arguments
Morgan I 16 Sanctions Policies/Morgan/Syropoulos/Yotov: Political scientists have long debated on whether sanctions “work” in the sense of achieving their stated goals. Early research was largely focused on prominent cases, such as the US sanctions on Cuba or the League of Nations sanctions on Italy mentioned earlier, and generally came to the conclusion that sanctions do not bring about significant changes in target state policies (Galtung 1967(1); Hoffmann 1967(2); Doxey 1972)(3). However, it was quickly recognized that this work suffered from a severe selection bias—the reason that the cases under study were “prominent” was precisely because they failed. Early statistical analyses based on the well-known Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990)(4) dataset indicated that sanctions achieve their political objectives in about one-fourth to one-third of the cases. Much of the research into sanctions conducted by political scientists has focused on a puzzle: if sanctions seldom “work,” then why do they continue to be applied, and at an increasing rate? Several broad approaches have been taken to address this puzzle. First, some argued that although sanctions seem ineffective at achieving their stated objectives, they may be relatively effective in achieving their “true” objectives. For example, some sanctions may aim to support domestic interests (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007)(5), while others may aim to serve symbolic (Lindsay 1986) or signaling (Schwebach 2000)(6) purposes. Second, several theoretical arguments suggest that sanctions should not be expected to achieve their objectives except under very specific conditions (Morgan and Schwebach 1997)(7). For example, Wagner (1988)(8) posited that if we applied bargaining theory to the agreements that produced the economic exchanges that sanctions disrupt, we would conclude that sanctions should, in most cases, harm the sender as much as they harm the target. In other words, the leverage provided by sanctions cuts both ways. Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi (2021)(9) offer evidence suggesting that sanctions often “work” at the threat stage; consequently, successful sanctions might not actually be imposed.* Third, even in their worst light, sanctions have been shown to be effective in a modest fraction of cases. Even a 25 percent success rate for sanctions may be considerably higher than doing nothing, and the costs may be substantially lower than other alternatives, like overt military interventions. Perhaps the “sanctions glass” should be viewed as one-quarter full, not three-quarters empty. Finally, it may be possible to identify specific factors that lead to increases in the costs that sanctions impose on targets and thus to determine when sanctions have been ineffective and how to make them more likely to be effective. Morgan I 17 For example, Attia, Grauvogel, and von Soest (2020)(10) suggest that poor economic health and high political volatility in targets are important determinants of sanctions success. Others have found that the extent of the interrupted economic relationship is a significant factor in sanctions success (Bapat et al. 2013)(11). Moreover, the availability of sanctions busters, or “Black Knights,” can enable targets to avoid significant costs (Early 2011)(12). Relatedly, multilateral sanctions, especially when imposed under the auspices of an international organization, increase target costs relatively more than unilateral sanctions (Martin 1992(13); Bapat and Morgan 2009(14); Early 2021)(15). Finally, sanctions are more likely to be effective when imposed on democracies than when imposed on autocracies, because democratic governments are more susceptible to costs felt by their populaces (Allen 2008(16); Lektzian and Souva 2007)(17). However, all of the above findings appear quite sensitive to model specification (Bapat et al. 2013)(18). Indeed, given alternative models and specifications, the weight of the evidence might even turn against these findings (Demena et al. 2021)(19). Conclusion: Overall, the lessons that emerge from the analysis in this section do not seem altogether consistent. Sanctions do seem to cause significant economic damage to the targets across various dimensions. However, although it seems intuitively clear that economic damage and costs to the target states should be key factors affecting the probability for sanctions success, there is no robust evidence for a clear causal link between economic costs and the political success of sanctions. Moreover, while recent trends suggest the presence of an improvement in sanction effectiveness, overall sanctions are still not perceived as particularly successful policy tools. >Sanctions, >Sanctions consequences, >Sanctions debate, >Sanctions effectiveness, >Sanctions evasion, >Sanctions history, >Sanctions policies, >Sanctions theory, >Trade sanctions, >Financial sanctions. 1. Galtung, Johan. 1967. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia.” World Politics 19 (3): 378–416. 2. Hoffmann, Fredrik. 1967. “The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis.” Journal of Peace Research 4 (2): 140–59. 3. Doxey, Margaret. 1972. “International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa.” International Organization 26 (3): 527–50. 4. Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly A. Elliott. 1990. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute. 5. Kaempfer, William H. and Anton D. Lowenberg. 2007. “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions.” In Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 2, edited by Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, 867–911. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 6. Schwebach, Valerie L. 2000. “Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of Resolve?” In Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, edited by Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury, 187–211. International Political Economy Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 7. Morgan, T. Clifton and Valerie L. Schwebach. 1997. “Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises.” International Studies Quarterly 41 (1): 27–50. 8. Wagner, R. Harrison. 1988. “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence.” International Organization 42 (3): 461–83. 9. Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin A. Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi. 2021. “The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions Data Project: A Retrospective.” In Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, edited by Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 44–61. Chetenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 10. Attia, Hana, Julia Grauvogel, and Christian von Soest. 2020. “The Termination of International Sanctions: Explaining Target Compliance and Sender Capitulation.” European Economic Review 129: 103565. 11. Bapat, Navin A., Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2013. “Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data.” International Interactions 39 (1): 79–98. 12. Early, Bryan R. 2011. “Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (4): 381–402. 13. Martin, Lisa L. 1992. Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 14. Bapat, Navin A., and T. Clifton Morgan. 2009. “Multilateral versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A est Using New Data.” International Studies Quarterly 53 (4): 1075–94. 15. Early, Bryan R. 2021. “Making Sanctions Work: Promoting Compliance, Punishing Violations, and Discouraging Sanctions Busting.” In Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, edited by Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, 167–86. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 16. Allen, Susan Hannah. 2008. “Political Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions.” Foreign Policy Analysis 4 (3): 255–74. 17. Lektzian, David and Mark Souva. 2007. “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success.” Journal f Conflict Resolution 51 (6): 848–71. 18. Bapat, Navin A., Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2013. “Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data.” International Interactions 39 (1): 79–98. 19. Demena, Binyam A., Alemayehu S. Reta, Gabriela Benalcazar Jativa, Patrick B. Kimararungu, and Peter A. G. van Bergeijk. 2021. “Publication Bias of Economic Sanctions Research: A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Trade Linkage, Duration and Prior Relations on Sanctions Success.” In Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, edited by Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, 125–50. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Syropoulos, Constantinos Morgan I T. Clifton Morgan Constantinos Syropoulos Yoto V. Yotov, "Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges." Journal of Economic Perspectives 37 (1): 3–30. 2023 |
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> Counter arguments against Syropoulos
> Counter arguments in relation to Sanctions Policies
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