Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Papineau on Representation - Dictionary of Arguments
I 248 Representation/Animals/Papineau: there is the danger to put more into the explanation than justified by the specific design of animals. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Behavior, >Animals, >Animal language. I 256 Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations? >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization. I 257 After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result. >Dispositions. Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"? >Embodiment. I do not want to dispute such content attributions. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B & T, V > R). Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: when it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple beings can be regarded as purpose-means thinkers. I 258 Explicit representation requires physical tangibility. Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment. I 259 Explicit/implicit: if an organism implicitly has different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them. Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information. >Adaption. Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings. Vs: 1. Purpose-middle-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom. 2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component... I 261 ...of our evolutionary heritage. Then purpose-means-thinking is a by-product. Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function. >Purpose, >Function._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Papineau
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation
