Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Voting: Voting in economics refers to the process by which individuals or groups express preferences on public policies, decisions, or resource allocations. It is a key component of collective choice theory, where the aggregation of individual preferences determines outcomes. Economic voting models analyze how voters' choices influence policy, taxation, government spending, and other economic issues. See also Public Choice, Rational Choice, Decision-making-process, Group behavior, Political elections, Electoral systems._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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James M. Buchanan on Voting - Dictionary of Arguments
Boudreaux I 67 Voting/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: 1) One difference between choosing by voting versus choosing in the market is that, in the market, each individual actually gets what he or she chooses. In voting, by contrast, those on the winning side generally get what they voted for, while those on the losing side have to take what those who win at the voting booth prefer. 2) Another important difference is that people who make market choices get what they chose immediately, whereas in voting even those who voted for the winning side only get a promise that they will eventually get what they voted for. Politics: Voters choose what they hope to get in the future rather than what they will get in the present. Therefore, in politics, even those on the winning side might not ever actually get what they voted for. One only need think of recent candidates for political office who have run on platforms promising balanced government budgets. >Political elections, >Electoral systems, >Democracy, >Parliamentary system. Economy/economic policies: Voters can vote for a balanced budget, but even if the candidate supporting that option wins, there is no guarantee that voters will actually see the budget being balanced. >Politics, >Economy, >Markets. 3) Yet another difference is that when individuals vote, they are expressing preferences for social outcomes to be applied to everyone. In contrast, when individuals engage in market transactions, they are making choices only for themselves. And an individual’s social preferences might differ from his or her personal preferences. Example: Buchanan offers a somewhat dated example by noting that a person might vote for alcohol prohibition but at the same time buy alcoholic beverages for personal consumption. Such behaviour is not necessarily inconsistent, Buchanan points out, because people’s preferences for rules that apply to everyone might legitimately differ from their personal consumption preferences. >Preferences, >Rational choice, >Public choice. Boudreaux I 68 Other differences between politics and markets arise because, except when the number of voters is tiny, the likelihood that any individual voter will cast a decisive vote is vanishingly small. First, individuals have less of an incentive to vote than they do to make market choices. (…) regardless of the quality of the choice the voter makes, he or she is served whatever public policies follow from the outcome of the election. Market/Elections: In the market, people are free to choose a variety of goods, and can make adjustments by taking a little more of some goods in exchange for a little less of others. But in voting, people choose between alternatives that are more or less mutually exclusive. Voting for one candidate’s platform means voting for everything in it, rather than voting for everything in a competing candidate’s platform. Boudreaux I 69 Political elections/Buchanan: One unfortunate result of what we might call “the bundling effect” is that no candidate really knows just why he or she won the election - or why other candidates lost the election. The difference is between having a bundle of goods that individuals choose themselves, as in the market, or a bundle of goods chosen by someone else. Even with this fact in sight, voting looks better than it really is. Voters can see the goods at the top of the basket, but there might be goods lower down in the cart that voters do not see and do not want. Individualism/politics/Buchanan: Buchanan offers many reasons why people are better off with institutions that allow them to make their own individual choices rather than having to accept outcomes that are collectively chosen. Yet he also sees that in some cases it is necessary to have collective choices to further individual welfare through the protective and productive state. Thus, when political decision-making is necessary, he calls for institutions to be designed so that they resemble as closely as possible the desirable characteristics of market institutions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
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