Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Clubs: In economics, clubs refer to organizations or groups that provide goods or services to members who pay for access. These goods are non-rivalrous (one person's consumption doesn't reduce availability for others) but excludable (only members can access them). Examples include private clubs, subscription-based services, or shared resources like cable television or software. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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James M. Buchanan on Club (Organization) - Dictionary of Arguments
Boudreaux I 43 Clubs/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: a) For a given membership size, there will be an optimal size of the club good. b) Similarly, for a given size of the club good, there will be an optimal size of the club’s membership. Buchanan solves these two issues simultaneously to show that the club has an optimal membership size and an optimal quantity, or size, of the club good. >Social goods, >Collective goods. Social goods/Buchanan: In this way, Buchanan’s theory of clubs provides a more realistic and complete depiction of the “publicness” of various goods. Viewed as an explanation of actual clubs, Buchanan’s theory sheds light on the reason they are organized as they are. His theory of clubs also sheds some light on the way that collective organizations, more generally, should be designed. Government/Federalism/Buchanan: Buchanan develops his theory explicitly around clubs, but it’s clear that the theory applies also to governments and lays a foundation for a theory of federalism. Club goods have an optimal size and an optimal sharing group, and different goods have different optimal sizes and sharing groups. Thus, his theory provides a sound rationale for having a federal system of governance with governments at different levels. A park or a library can be shared by people who live nearby, so the optimal sharing group typically will be smaller than the optimal sharing group for national defense - a good that exhibits significant economies of scale. Bigger armies with more powerful weapons have an advantage over smaller armies, so the optimal sharing group for national defense is larger than for parks and libraries. Similarly, the optimal sharing group for higher education is larger than for elementary education, so elementary education is produced at the local level while higher education is often produced at the state or national level. Some nations, and some states and provinces, have governments that are more centralized than others. Boudreaux I 44 If government is going to produce goods for collective consumption, Buchanan’s theory of clubs offers guidance on the optimal degree of centralization, and at what level various collectively consumed goods are most efficiently produced. The first question to answer is: What is the optimally sized sharing group for that particular good? >Federalism/Buchanan, >Government policy/Buchanan, >Government._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
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