Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability.
A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence.
B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas.
C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stephen Leeds on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
I 369 Truth/Truth theory/natural language/leeds: assumed a natural language without function symbols and labels. Only singular terms are names. >Singular terms, >Names, >Descriptions, >Reference, >Everyday language. Reference in L/RiL: Mapping names to denotations and predicates to extensions. >Denotation, >Predicates, >Extensions. Truth in L/TiL: Function that attributes the truth value to each sentence. >Truth values. Tarski/Leeds: Tarski showed that Ril canonically determines TiL. - That is, given the RiL, there is a way to write down the T-Def. >Truth definition. So every T-schema is determined by a reference schema. Problem: Merely knowing that WiL is one of the T-schemes is not sufficient for a definition of TiL. >Definition, >Definability, >Sufficiency. Solution: if we can define reference in L, then we can define truth. I 370 Reference/Definition of reference/Tarski/Leeds: implicitly present: R-sentence: "Caesar" refers to Caesar - ((s) This only works if descrptions are excluded) - This would be a standard interpretation (SI) for a natural language. SI-Theory: Proposition: Every language has an SI (standard interpretation). I 380 Truth/Leeds: Problem: Then "truth" is merely an artificial term for the possibility to make generalizations. >Generalization. Important point: then truth is theoretically dispensable. Leeds: it is not impossible to learn a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. Usefulness: of the W-concept: can be explained completely without reference (reference to the world!). Then it is not a theory of truth, but theory of T-concept. And this from formal facts of language, not from the relation language-world. Truth without reference: E.g., semantic ascent: "Some of Freud's theses are true, others are false". >Semantic ascent. I 381 The fact that we should tell the truth is a datum for the theory of the T-term. I 386 Generalization of infinite conjunction without T-term: exhort people to say only sentences they accept. T-Def/Leeds: on the other hand, the fact that Ex "All men are mortal" is true is a consequence of W-Def. (Along with the fact that all men are mortal). >Truthmakers, cf. >Correspondence theory._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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