Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Collective goods: Collective goods, or public goods, in economics are goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, meaning they can be used by everyone without reducing availability to others.. These goods often require government provision or regulation due to challenges in private market supply and free-rider issues. See also Free-rider, Non-rivalty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gustave de Molinari on Collective Goods - Dictionary of Arguments
Rothbard III 1030 Collective goods/Molinari/Rothbard: Many attempts have been made (…), to salvage the concept of the "collective" good, to provide a seemingly ironclad, scientific justification for government operations. Molinari: Molinari, for example, trying to establish defense as a collective good, asserted: "A police force serves every inhabitant of the district in which it acts, but the mere establishment of a bakery does not appease their hunger." RothbardVsMolinari: But, on the contrary, there is no absolute necessity for a police force to defend every inhabitant of an area or, still more, to give each one the same degree of protection. Furthermore, an absolute pacifist, a believer in total nonviolence, living in the area, would not consider himself protected by, or receiving defense service from, the police. On the contrary, he would consider any police in his area a detriment to him. Hence, defense cannot be considered a "collective good" or "collective want." Similarly for such projects as dams, which cannot be simply assumed to benefit everyone in the area.(1) >Collective goods/Rothbard, >Social goods. 1. Gustave de Molinari, The Society ofTomorrow. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904. Reprinted by Taylor & Francis, 1972. p. 63. On the fallacy of collective goods, see S.R., Ibid., p. 63. On the fallacy of collective goods, see S.R., "Spencer As His Own Critic," Liberty, June, 1904, and Merlin H. Hunter and Harry K. Allen, Principles of Public Finance (New York: Harpers, 1940), p. 22. Molinari had not always believed in the existence of "collective goods," as can be seen from his remarkable "De la production de la sécurité," Journal des Economistes, February 15, 1849, and Molinari, "Onziéme soirée" in Les soirées de la Rue Saint Lazare (Paris, 1849)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Molinari I Gustave de Molinari The Production of Security Auburn, Alabama 2009 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
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