Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Social norms: Social norms are shared standards of acceptable behavior by which members of a society or group are expected to conform. These informal understandings govern individual behavior, influencing actions and decisions based on societal expectations. Norms can be unspoken or explicitly articulated, and they play a crucial role in maintaining order and predictability within social interactions. See also Society, Norms, Behavior, Social behavior, Expectations, Community._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Emanuela Carbonara on Social Norms - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 466 Social Norms/Carbonara: In the study of social norms, “efficiency” has several standard meanings, notably Pareto efficiency, cost–benefit efficiency, and welfare maximization. “Unfairness” also has several possible meanings, but the most frequently discussed today is discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation. In some circumstances, social norms are efficient and fair, requiring no regulation so long as private and criminal law operate in the background. In other circumstances, unregulated social norms waste resources or discriminate against individuals or groups. The main issue (…) is that the social norms prevailing at some historical moment may be just an equilibrium among multiple equilibriums. >Efficiency, >Equilibrium. Parisi I 467 Legal norms: Legal norms seemingly reinforce existing social norms, bending them towards the law when discrepancy exists and favoring their creation where social norms do not exist. Parisi I 469 Social norms/Carbonara: (…) we could define a “perfect social norm” as a behavioral regularity caused by coordination, non-legal sanctions, and internalization. Efficiency; On the efficiency of social norms, see Posner (1996)(1) and Mahoney and Sanchirico (2000)(2). Fairness: The interplay of honor, stigma, and the law is often responsible Parisi I 470 for the perpetuation of such rules. Banabou and Tirole (2011)(3) show how such forces, together with the expressive power of the law, may explain why people resist legal changes that would enhance efficiency and lead to more “effective” laws. >Path dependence/Carbonara. 1. Posner, Eric A. (1996). “Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144: 1697–1744. 2. Mahoney, P. G. and C. W. Sanchirico (2000). “Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149: 2027–2062. 3. Banabou, R. and J. Tirole (2011). “Laws and Norms.” NBER Working Paper 17579. Emanuela Carbonara. “Law and Social Norms”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Carbonara, Emanuela Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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> Counter arguments against Carbonara
> Counter arguments in relation to Social Norms
