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Positive Political Theory on Competition - Dictionary of Arguments

Parisi I 225
Competition/Positive Political Theory/Tiller: [there are] three general theaters of political-institutional competition—the horizontal, the vertical, and the internal.
a) Horizontal: The horizontal theater involves institutions interacting on primarily equal standing in a policy struggle, such as when the U.S. Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court battle for a policy outcome.
b) Vertical: The vertical theater involves a more direct principal-agent struggle, such as what we see in a judicial hierarchy where higher courts attempt to control the outcomes of lower courts through doctrinal statements and reversals, and lower courts attempt to avoid higher court surveillance and discipline through a variety of decision strategies (e.g. opinion publication choices, case outcome choices, and selectively choosing grounds to support a decision).
c) Internal: (…) the internal theater involves actors internal to an institution vying for the policy outcomes of the institution as a whole. This includes, for example, judges sitting together on a judicial panel who have different preferences over the case outcome, or the two houses of Congress (and their specialized committees) competing with each other over legislative enactments. The competitive moves could include, for example,
Parisi I 225
opinion drafting and circulation for judges, and, for legislatures, amendment proposals and strategic assignment of bills to committees. (…) judges on a judicial panel often compete in the internal theater in the shadow of the higher court's vertical relationship to the lower court. This latter scenario has been the central focus of the recent "panel effects" literature (Cross and Tiller, 1998(1); Kim, 2009(2); Kastellec, 2011)(3). >Law/Positive Political Theory, >Legal doctrine/Positive Political Theory, >Positive Political Theory/Tiller.

1. Cross, Frank B. and Emerson H. Tiller (1998). "Essay, Judicial Partisan and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals." Yale Law Journal 107:
2. Kim, Pauline T. (2009). "Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Court of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 15 7: 1319-1381.
3. Kastellec, Jonathan (2011). "Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Court of Appeals." Journal of Politics 73:345—361.

Tiller, Emerson H. “The “Law” and Economics of judicial decision-making. A Positive Political Theory Perspective.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Positive Political Theory
Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017

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