Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Federalism: Federalism is a system of government in which power is divided between a central government and regional governments. This division of power is often enshrined in a constitution, which outlines the responsibilities of each level of government. See also State._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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James M. Buchanan on Federalism - Dictionary of Arguments
Boudreaux I 44 Federalism/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Buchanan refers to federalism as “an ideal political order” with several advantages. 1) First, federalism pushes government production toward having more market-oriented characteristics. Consider a supermarket analogy. Shoppers can enter the supermarket and choose among many items to put into their market baskets for purchase. Each shopper can choose, individually, which items to buy and which not to buy. No two shoppers need make the same selections. In contrast, whatever market basket a government provides is provided to everyone within that government’s jurisdiction. Of course, politicians run for office by offering different political platforms to voters - different market baskets - but all voters end up with the particular market basket that the winner of the election supplies. Federalism offers citizens more choice, because citizens can choose among jurisdictions. Obviously this choice is not exactly like filling one’s own individualized supermarket basket. But if a person has many jurisdictions to choose among, she can choose the particular jurisdiction, or basket, that comes closest to satisfying her desires. As Buchanan says, “The principle of federalism emerges directly from the market analogy” (Buchanan, 2001(1): 69). 2) Buchanan also saw federalism as a mechanism for constraining the actions of governments. Most obviously, under federalism people can move from one local or provincial jurisdiction to another. Eager to keep and to attract citizens, governments at the same level in a federal system thus each have stronger incentives to provide a mix and pricing of public goods that is attractive to large numbers of people. In addition, federalism can encourage governments at different levels to police each other. This outcome is most evident in contemporary society when higher-level governments constrain the activities of governments below them. But Buchanan also sees a potential role for lower-level governments to monitor and police governments at higher levels. Boudreaux I 45 To this end, he recommends the possibility of secession. If lower-level governments have the right to secede from the jurisdiction of a higher-level government, the higher-level government has stronger incentives to govern wisely and effectively than if secession were impossible. There is also a connection between federalism and individual liberty because federalism gives individuals a choice of government jurisdictions. The choice itself is beneficial, but the fact that the choice exists also helps prevent governments from abusing their power, because abused citizens can more easily leave. >Constitution/Buchanan, >Externalities/Buchanan. 1. Buchanan, James M. (2001). Federalism, Liberty, and the Law. Liberty Fund. Buchanan, James M. (2006). Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism. Edward Elgar._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
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