Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Franz Brentano on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
Chisholm I 130 Unity of Consciousness/Brentano(1): if a person imagines something, or at the same time imagines several objects, he also recognizes at the same time the simultaneity of both. For example, if one hears a melody, he hears the one tone as present while he perceives the other as past. ... in which of the experiences is the idea of their simultaneity? In none! >Imagination. On the contrary, it is clear that the inner cognition of the one with the other belongs to the same real unity. I 131 Consciousness/Chisholm/Unity/Brentano/Chisholm: suggests the following principle: if it is certain for x that it is F and also that it is G, then it is also certain that it is F and G. Cf. >Perception/Kant. This seems unquestionable on the basis of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. ChisholmVs: it seems to be too strict, however. Kant: the subject, does not need to unite the ideas, it only needs to appear that it could. If it is true for x that it is F, and also that it is G, and it is considering the question whether it is both F and G, then it is certain for it. I 132 This also applies to proposed premises. 1. F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Hamburg, 1973, p. 227f --- Chisholm II 269 Consciousness/Brentano/Hedwig: Brentano has never admitted the psychological abyss of consciousness, but always insisted on the uniqueness of thinking. Chisholm II = Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Ed.), Amsterdam 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 |
||
> Counter arguments against Brentano
> Counter arguments in relation to Consciousness
