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Preferences: Preferences are our relative likings for different things. They are shaped by our individual experiences, values, and goals. See also Actions, Action theory, Goals, Purposes, Experience, Values, Rationality.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

John Harsanyi on Preferences - Dictionary of Arguments

Gaus I 244
Preferences/diversity/pluralism/rational choice/Harsanyi/D’Agostino: (...) Arrow's Theorem, and its extensions, can be read as an argument for monism. Arrow courts chaos in providing, as pluralists would insist, for the recognition of diversity. >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino
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If the price for the avoidance of chaos is the abandonment of pluralism, this is anyway warranted by the fact that all apparent diversity is ethico-politically insignificant and merely conceals a deeper uniformity of assessments that sustains coherence in social arrangements.
Harsanyi: This reading is implicit, for instance, in John Harsanyi's (1977)(1) attempt to show that, even when they differ in their assessments of options, individuals can be brought to share the same 'extended preferences' about social arrangements, and that coherent collective choice procedures can be defined on the basis of such ('extended') assessments. And, of course, it has indeed been suggested, more pertinently, that specifically liberal doctrines and institutions are incompatible with pluralism and, hence, with the evaluative diversity which this family of doctrines and arguments sanctions (see Kekes, 1992(2); Crowder, 1994(3)).
D’Agostino: Much recent liberal political theory can, however, profitably be interpreted, I submit, as an attempt to find a principled basis for acknowledging the demands both of diversity and of coherence. >Arrow’s Theorem/Weale, >Diversity/D’Agostino, >Pluralism/Political Philosophy.

1. Harsanyi, John (1977) 'Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility'. In his Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour and Scientific Explanation. Dordrecht: Reidel.
2. Kekes, John (1992) 'The incompatibility of liberalism and pluralism'. American Philosophical Quarterly, 29: 141-51.
3. Crowder, George (1994) 'Pluralism and liberalism'. Political Studies, 42: 293-305.

D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Harsanyi, John
Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004


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