Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Contractualism: Contractualism is a moral theory that holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by whether it would be agreed to by rational individuals in a hypothetical contract. See also Contract theory, Contracts._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Gauthier on Contractualism - Dictionary of Arguments
Gaus I 107 Contractualism/liberalism/Gauthier/Gaus: (...) the last 20 years has witnessed the induction of Hobbes as a core member of the liberal pantheon. In addition to his relentless individualist analysis on humans in society, the liberalization of Hobbes has been driven by his contractualism, and the way in which it lends itself to game-theoretic modelling, most importantly in the work of Jean Hampton (1986(1); for a discussion see Kraus, 1993(2)). At first blush one might think that Hobbes did not offer a moral contractualist theory at all: the laws of nature are pre-contractual moral norms, and the contract concerns the institution of a political sovereign, not agreement on moral norms. Gauthier: However, as David Gauthier (1995(3)) has stressed, the Hobbesian contract involves an authorization of the sovereign’s use of reason as right reason, including his reasoning about what morality requires; it is thus a political contract that subsumes morality. In any event, recent analyses inspired by Hobbes - most importantly Gauthier (1986)(4) -have converted the Hobbesian approach into an account of justified morality which, in turn, endorses liberal arrangements (for doubts about the Hobbesian pedigree of Gauthier, see Lloyd, 1998(5)). >Hobbes/Economic theories. Gaus I 108 Gauthier argues that, in order to best pursue their goals, rational maximizers would agree to stop making maximizing choices. If individuals could adopt a disposition to obey the social contract the second problem, that of compliance, would be solved; once they have this disposition – this tendency to act – they no longer make choices by calculating what would best advance their goals, but on the basis of what would advance their goals in ways allowed for by the contract. If people adopted this disposition, then, somewhat paradoxically, they would do better at maximization, as they could honour the agreement that benefits all. Gauthier calls this ‘constrained maximization’ (1986(4): 158). Problem: (...) the truly rational thing to do is to appear to turn yourself into a constrained maximizer while others really turn themselves into constrained maximizers. Gauthier has a two-part response. (1) Constrained maximizers do not adopt an unconditional disposition to constrain themselves no matter with whom they interact. They are only disposed to act in a constrained manner with those who are also constrained maximizers. (2) Gauthier insists that we are not totally opaque to each other; to some extent we can see into others and know their dispositions. As he puts it, we are ‘translucent’. Thus, concludes Gauthier, a rational agent would not seek to remain an unconstrained maximizer when others turn themselves into constrained maximizers. >Rational choice/Gauthier. 1. Hampton, Jean (1986) Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Kraus, Jody S. (1993) The Limits of Hobbesian Contractualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Gauthier, David (1995) ‘Public reason’. Social Philosophy & Policy, 12 (Winter): 19–42. 4. Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 5. Lloyd, S. A. (1998) ‘Contemporary uses of Hobbes’s political philosophy’. In Jules S. Coleman and Christopher Morris, eds, Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gauthier, David Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Contractualism
