Robert E. Goodin on Opposition - Dictionary of Arguments
Gaus I 148
Opposition/Goodin/Dryzek: (...) as Robert Goodin (2002(1): 125) and others point out, discussion is fine so long as people then subsequently exercise their own independent judgements when voting. Goodin then questions an epistemic democracy rooted in Rousseau and the jury theorem by pointing out that in a dynamic context, their implication is that minorities should rationally and immediately cease their opposition when a majority votes against them.
Persistent opposition therefore makes sense only when values differ, but not when only factual judgements vary 2002(1): 144). If only factual judge- ments are at issue, an epistermc approach threatens to wipe out the contestatory aspect of democracy. >Deliberative democracy/Dryzek, >Democracy/Dryzek, >Jury theorem/Condorcet.
1. Goodin, Robert E. (2002) Reflective Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
|Goodin, Robert E.
Gerald F. Gaus
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004