Economics Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Gerald F. Gaus on Preference Utilitarianism - Dictionary of Arguments

Gaus I 106
Preference Utilitarianism/economic theories/Gaus: Many standard economic utilitarian cases for liberalism presuppose interpersonal comparisons of utility. Although economists are sensitive to problems of comparing the utilities of different people, a great deal of political economy does so (Mueller, 2003(1): 566ff). If, instead, we suppose that the utilities (or happiness, or pleasure) of different people are incommensurable, we confront the problems of pluralism and social incommensurabilities (...). Even given incommensurable personal utilities, we still can make some minimal overall welfarist judgements.
Pareto optimum: According to the Pareto criterion,
(1) social state S1 is Pareto-superior to S2 if and only if at least one person is better off in S1 than in S2 and no one is worse off in S1 than in S2 ; and
(2) if no state is Pareto-superior to S1 , then S1 is in the set of Pareto-optimal social states.
These criteria, of course, may identify a large set of Paretooptimal states, and so might often be indecisive among the choices open to us. Even though it may often be indecisive, at least the Pareto criterion avoids the problem identified by Rawls: sacrificing the welfare of the few to benefit the many is excluded. Thus Paretian welfarism would seem at least consistent with liberalism. >Pareto optimum/Sen.


1. Mueller, Dennis C. (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Gaus
> Counter arguments in relation to Preference Utilitarianism

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z