Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Neutrality: Neutrality in political philosophy is the view that the government should not take sides on controversial social and moral issues. It is based on the belief that all citizens should be free to hold their own beliefs and values. One problem is that it is impossible for the government to be truly neutral on all issues. Another problem is that neutrality can lead to indifference to injustice and oppression. See also Justice, Society, Impartiality, Idealization._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ronald Dworkin on Neutrality - Dictionary of Arguments
Gaus I 92 Political neutrality/liberalism/Dworkin/Waldron: Problem: It does not seem to have occurred to Locke, Kant, and Mill that [the] foundational positions would pose a problem for the politics of liberalism in a society whose members disagreed about the existence of God, the nature of reason, and the destiny of the human individual. The difficulty (...) came to the fore in discussions of ‘liberal neutrality’ in the 1970s and 1980s. A number of theorists attempted to sum up the essence of liberalism in terms of a principle requiring the state to refrain from taking sides on disputed ethical and religious questions. Dworkin: Ronald Dworkin suggested the liberal commitment to treating people as equals meant that political decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life or of what gives value to life. Since the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another, either because the officials believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is held by the more numerous or more powerful group. (1985(1): 191) Waldron: Dworkin did not suppose that neutrality was a general moral requirement, one that everyone should strive to satisfy. Neutrality was proposed as a principle of specifically political morality. It is not wrong for someone to favour a particular conception of what gives value to life, but it is wrong for him to do so in his capacity as a legislator or as a judge. >Neutrality/Larmore. 1. Dworkin, Ronald (1985) A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Dworkin
> Counter arguments in relation to Neutrality
