Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Recognition, philosophy: the ability of a conscious subject to identify a pattern that has already been received by this subject. This ability is no knowledge-how and no quale, since there is no particular way of experience that all the cases of recognition have in common. However, the ability to recognize certain features can be learned, but this is actually an identification and no recognition. See also memory, qualia, knowledge-how, knowledge, computation, identification, individuation, similarity, equality._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Michael E. Dummett on Recognition - Dictionary of Arguments
III (b) 68ff Recognition/Dummett: It is (...) not absurd to assume that one can have the ability to recognize something without being able to explain this ability. Even if there is no explanation, there must be a description: Object/Knowledge/Dummett: Question: what does the presentation of an object actually mean? Example Valencia: should you be able to pick out the city on the map? from the ground?, from the plane, or only when you are in it, or only in a specific building? In other words, there is no single concept of the presentation of an object. Object/recognition/Frege/Dummett: Important: The ability to recognize includes the awareness that this object falls under the term that determines the appropriate identity criterion (here: "city"). >Descriptions. III (c) 135 Attribution/reference/way of givenness/Frege: Attribution of pure object knowledge without further marking of the meaning is incomprehensible! An object must somehow be given. There can be no "mere knowledge of the reference". Cf. >Description Theory/Dummett._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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