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Truth conditions: the conditions under which statements, propositions, assertions, etc. are true are called truth conditions. In order to understand a sentence, according to some theories, it is sufficient to know its truth conditions. (Compare M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt, 1992, p. 20). According to these theories, one can understand not only true but also false sentences. See also semantics, sentence meaning, understanding, truth, meaning.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Robert Stalnaker on Truth Conditions - Dictionary of Arguments

I 190
Truth Conditions/fact/Stalnaker: the fact-dependence points to an ambiguity of the truth conditions: under what conditions is e.g. "Julius invented the zipper" true? Would it also have been true if Eli Whitney invented it instead of Judson?
a) When it comes to what is expressed actually (in the real world) with the statement "Julius ...", then the answer is "no"!
b) But if Whitney had actually been the inventor, then the answer is "yes"! Truth conditions: truth conditions can therefore be represented in the sense of b) by functions of possible worlds on truth values.
>Possible worlds/Stalnaker
, >Rigidity/Stalnaker, >Reference/Stalnaker.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


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