Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth conditions: the conditions under which statements, propositions, assertions, etc. are true are called truth conditions. In order to understand a sentence, according to some theories, it is sufficient to know its truth conditions. (Compare M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt, 1992, p. 20). According to these theories, one can understand not only true but also false sentences. See also semantics, sentence meaning, understanding, truth, meaning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.A. Foster on Truth Conditions - Dictionary of Arguments
I 24 Truth-conditions/solution/Foster: the truth-conditions are the subset of all the circumstances with which the sentence matches. ->Possible worlds. - It is binary relation between sentence and world. Counterfactual conditional: "(x) (x is true-of w, if and only if when w would exist, it would be the case that p)". >Counterfactual conditionals. Problem: this is non- extensional! The truth conditional would no longer be true when instead of "p" a material equivalent sentence were used with other truth-conditions. >Intension, >Extension. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Conditions
