Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Truth conditions: the conditions under which statements, propositions, assertions, etc. are true are called truth conditions. In order to understand a sentence, according to some theories, it is sufficient to know its truth conditions. (Compare M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt, 1992, p. 20). According to these theories, one can understand not only true but also false sentences. See also semantics, sentence meaning, understanding, truth, meaning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Michael E. Dummett on Truth Conditions - Dictionary of Arguments
II 72 Truth Conditions/Dummett: Truth conditions are assumed to be given. - But only for each type of speech act. - A theory of >force must then distinguish between question, command, etc. Being able to specify truth conditions = being able to paraphrase the sentence, not just adding the predicate "true"! - The truth conditions themselves may not presume understanding of the sentence precisely then when the sentence is to be explained. - ((s) But you have to know what the sentence means, if you want to judge whether the fact is given, or whether a paraphrase is correct). II 95 Truth Conditions/Dummett: E.g. observation of what it means for a tree to be bigger. - Observation of skills: cannot figure out in principle in what exactly the ability consists (the truth conditions for the attribution of skills are needed). II 100 Truth Conditions/Dummett: you cannot know them if you cannot tell when they are satisfied. --- III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: An explanation of sense has to be given by truth conditions. - Tractatus/Wittgenstein: dito: Under which circumstances is a sentence true... >Sense, cf. >Fregean sense. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for this one must already know what the statement that "P is true" means. Vs: if that means that P is true, it means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what was to be explained. >Meaning. VsRedundancy Theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. III (c) 122 Thinking-to-be-true/Dummett: the conditions for this are specified by the truth theory! Problem: the truth conditions are not always recognizable, even if met. Solution: to think that something is true requires only knowledge of the truth conditions, not knowing whether they are fulfilled._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
||
> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Conditions
