Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Imagination - Dictionary of Arguments

V 57f
Imagination/Tradition/Quine: problem: imagine the same odd and even numbers. Solution: imagination as a hypothetical nervous state. Then you do not have to fix the number of spots on a chicken you are seeing.
V 178
Imagination/liveliness/Hume: liveliness: is the differentiator for imagination: memory: is attenuated sensation. Fantasy: is attenuated recollection. QuineVsHume: imagination: is an event in the nervous system that leads to dispositions.
V 57/58
Imagination/Tradition/Quine: Problem: For example, if one could imagine a number that would be both even and odd.
Imagination/Quine: Solution: if you take imaginary images as hypothetical nerve states, there are no such problems. Concerning a nervous state one does not have to commit oneself to e.g. the number of spots of a chicken.
Idea/Concept/Berkeley/Hume/Quine: the two were not innocent and even drew the line before the abstract idea of the triangle and only allowed ideas of certain triangles.
QuineVsTradition: these are vain questions about the causal connection of ideas.
Psychology/Peirce: the only way to examine a psychological question is to rely on external facts.
V 59
Quine: Problem: how can you do that if you only talk about outer things and not about inner things like ideas?
>Ideas/Quine
.
Solution/Quine: by talking about language. ((s) >Semantic Ascent).
V 177
Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of previous observations where the term was learned by definition rather than by conditioning. Since a defined term can be replaced by its definiendum, this results in a composite observation term. Example: "I have seen a black rabbit":
Learning situation: once for black, once for rabbit, as well as for attributive composition.
Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of imaginary images we can say that they are evoked even if the corresponding object is not present.
Now, however, we must go further and require even more skills: the child must distinguish between two types of imaginary images:
a) Imagination.
b) Memories.
V 178
QuineVsHume: has made little convincing reference to liveliness as a distinguishing feature.
Def Memory/Hume: is attenuated sensation.
Def Imagination/Hume: is weakened memory.
>Memory/Quine.
Def Imagination/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for corresponding stimulation. This indicative nerve process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways:
a) Summary of previously learned elements such as "black" and "rabbit".
b) Strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. through a real previous encounter with a black rabbit. Is the basis for affirmation.
V 179
Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and to the calendar clock and, if applicable, to a location. Is a complex observation term.
Protocol Sentence: is a timeless sentence (of eternal duration) if place and time data are complete.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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