Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Judgments: A judgment differs from a statement in that it also asserts the truth of its content. In logic, this is expressed with a graphical emphasis, the judgment stroke. See also Truth, Statements, Assertions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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E. Tugendhat on Judgments - Dictionary of Arguments
III 195 Judgment is entitled to be true - the only reason why one may ask whether it is true. Dummett: a judgment is not provided when claiming. >Anti-realism, >Assertion. Judgment/Tugendhat: the form does not tell if it is true. >Truth, >Meaning._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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