Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Stalnaker on Beliefs - Dictionary of Arguments
I 54 Belief/objective/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis all objective impersonal beliefs are beliefs about what exists in reality, and not about the place of the believer in the world. They are either necessarily true or necessarily false. But beliefs do not express anything. - - - Schiffer I 46 Belief/Stalnaker/Schiffer: a belief with content can have the form: "x believes that dogs have fleas". A belif without content can have the form: "x is a belief". Stalnaker/Stampe: counterfactual: x believes p iff. x is in a brain state, that x would not be under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. >Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditionals. Representation/Dretske: example fuel gauge: is a reliable indicator (> reliability) by regularity for the representation. SchifferVs: problem: if the condition is never met. Conclusion: if propositions are belief objects, then the theory is never functionalist. >Functionalism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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