Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Conceptualism, philosophy: the thesis that concepts are constructions of the human mind and, for their part, have no real existence. This also denies the existence of universals. They exist at most as divisions, but not as ideas. See also nominalism, conceptual realism, platonism, universals, ideas._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Charles B. Martin on Conceptualism - Dictionary of Arguments
Place I 25 Def Conceptualism/Place: (PlatoVs, Aristotle pro, Place pro). Everything belongs to one of these 4 categories: 1) concrete particular 2) property of a particular 3) situation 4) property of a situation (II 31 also property of a property e.g. syntactic relations within a sentence are relations between words. >Universals, >Property, >Situation, >Particulars. Def words: consist in certain formal properties either of an event (of vocal expression) or particular: (characters). >Words. II 26 Conceptualism/Armstrong: i.e. there are no abstractions such as numbers, sets or laws of nature (as states in the world, only as formulas that describe something. Universals/Conceptualism: exist in two respects: 1) in the sense in which its instances exist (they really occur) 2) in the sense that living organisms are predisposed to classify particulars, and that the classifications are represented in the semantic conventions of natural language - i.e. as abstractions due to similarities between particulars. - - - Place II 49 ConceptualismVsAbstractions/Place: VsNominalization of "fragility" in subject position - VsPossible Worlds. >Possible worlds, >Abstraction. II 56 Conceptualism/Place: but conceptualism does not deny universals. - - - Place III 110 Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar, so that they can be "of the same kind" - in this sense they cannot be "inexactly" similar U/Species/Conceptualism/Place: U not in addition to the similarities between their instantiations - solution: "species", "U": viewed from the perspective of the object: which properties do the particulars need to have - "concept", "intention": affect the disposition of the mind for classification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
||
Authors A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Concepts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
