Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Semantic ascent, philosophy: semantic ascent is an expression by W.V.O. Quine (Quine, From a logical point of view, Harvard, 1953). The semantic ascent is no longer about objects, but about the use of expressions for these objects and of expressions for properties which we ascribe to these objects. In this way, the question as to which objects an ontology is fixed on is only indirectly addressed. See also mention, use, meaning, reference, semantic descent, ontology, non-existence, predication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Semantic Ascent - Dictionary of Arguments
I 96 Semantic ascent/Field: Not a set of axioms (not logically true), but weaker: with a modal operator (diamond) "It is possible that" in front. - Then it is logically true that it is logically possible. >Logical truth, >Logical possibility. I 245 Semantic ascent: "not every axiom of this theory is true" is a solution for infinitely axiomatized theories. >Axioms, >Axiom systems._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |