Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
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Seeing: In philosophy, the following questions related to seeing are interesting. The nature of perception, the relationship between perception and knowledge, the role of vision in human experience. See also Perception, Sensory impressions, Experience, Knowledge, Art, Artworks, Aesthetics, Aesthetic perception._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Seeing - Dictionary of Arguments
Graeser I 154 Seeing/Seeing as/Wittgenstein/Graeser: to see something as something is not a propositional attitude. >Propositional attitudes. - - - Wittgenstein II 27 Expectation and actual seeing have the same logical diversity, and here expectation and event are comparable, but not in the sense in which image and original are comparable. II 101 Seeing/Wittgenstein: in the primary sense one does not see with the eyes; this connection is contingent. You see what you dream, but not with your eyes. II 167 Seeing/Criteria/Wittgenstein: if there is no criterion for seeing the same sense date, then there is no point in saying "I cannot know if he sees what I see". (See II 33.) >Criteria, >Sense data. II 168 Seeing/Searching/Wittgenstein: the process of looking is searching, not seeing! II 227 Seeing/Wittgenstein: nonsense: to say: "it has passed too quickly for me to have seen it." But too quick for what? - - - VI 87 Seeing/Wittgenstein/Schulte: "Nothing in the visual field suggests that one eye can see it." My field of vision is characterized by being seen from my point of view, but the field of vision itself has neither my own point of view nor that of others. Because there is no "mine" and "yours" here, one can speak of "the field of vision". VI 205 Rabbit-Duck-Head/Seeing Aspects/Picture Puzzle/Wittgenstein/Schulte: even with a picture puzzle we always "see" the same, for example the same tree, until we discover the thief in the foliage. >Rabbitt-Duck-Head. VI 206 Am I seeing something else now, or am I just interpreting what I see in different ways? I am inclined to say the former, but why? Interpreting: is action! >Interpretation. Seeing: is no action, but a condition! (BPP § 1). Introspection does not help when changing shapes. VI 207 The aspect is not something that needs to be hidden away from the communication._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |