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Robots, philosophy: robot is a concept for technically realized spatially delimited mechanically acting systems that are able to fulfill defined tasks. The tasks are communicated to the system by means of a code. Further developments concern the increase of possible interfaces to the external world such as artificial sensory organs as well as the flexibility of possible responses of the system to commands. See also artificial intelligence, artificial consciousness, connectivity, learning, machine learning, neural networks, systems, zombies, autonomy, ethics.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Daniel Dennett on Robots - Dictionary of Arguments

Brockman I 51
Robots/Dennett: Problem: Robots would not (…) share with us (..) our vulnerability or our mortality.
Solution: (…) a robot that could sign a binding contract with you - not as a surrogate for some human owner but on its own. This isn’t a question of getting it to understand the clauses or manipulate a pen on a piece of paper but of having and deserving legal status as a morally responsible agent. The problem for robots who might want to attain such an exalted status is that, like Superman, they are too invulnerable to be able to make a credible promise. If they were to renege, what would happen? What would be the penalty for promise breaking? Being locked in a cell or, more plausibly, dismantled?
Brockman I 52
(…) dismantling an AI (either a robot or a bedridden agent like Watson) is not killing it if the information stored in its design and software is preserved.
Solution/Dennett: So what we are creating are not - should not be - conscious, humanoid agents but an entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no distracting loves and hates, no personality (but all sorts of foibles and quirks that would no doubt be identified as the “personality” of the system): boxes of truths (if we’re lucky) almost certainly contaminated with a scattering of falsehoods. >Strong AI/Dennett.



Dennett, D. “What can we do?”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Brockman I
John Brockman
Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019


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