Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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E. Tugendhat on Representation - Dictionary of Arguments
I 86 Representation/transcendental/Tugendhat: newer direction: renounced representations and put clear that consciousness refers to the objects directly rather than through internal representations. >Consciousness, >Intensional objects, >Internal objects, >Imagination, >Mental objects, >Mentalism I 307 Representation/Tugendhat: there are rather signs than representations: understanding means competent use of the signs. Basic: e.g. "and" and "or"; not asserting. >Understanding, >Signs. Instead: verification rules, then use rules. >Verification, >Use, >Logical constants._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Representation
