Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Scope, range, logic, philosophy: range is a property of quantifiers or operators to be able to be applied to a larger or smaller range. For example, the necessity operator N may be at different points of a logical formula. Depending on the positioning, the resulting statement has a considerably changed meaning. E.g. great range "It is necessary that there is an object that ..." or small range "There is an object that is necessarily ....". See also quantifiers, operators, general invariability, stronger/weaker, necessity, Barcan Formula._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Wiggins on Scope - Dictionary of Arguments
II 294 Necessity de re/scope/Wiggins: wide rage: on set (square, "N"): A. It is a consequence, not a postulate that it has a transparent subject position. WigginsVs: that is inconvenient if one assumes opacity. >Opacity. II 295 As analogous to negation: a whole sentence with ("~") or predicate ("Neg") may be used. Question: can the two be merged? Only in a name, not in constants. >Names, >Constants, >Reference._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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