|Realism, philosophy: realism is a collective term for theories which, in principle, believe that it is possible for us to acquire knowledge about objects of the external world that is independent from us as perceptual subjects. A strong realism typically represents the thesis that it would make sense to even create hypotheses about basically unknowable objects. See also metaphysical realism, internal realism, universal realism, constructivism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|The mere recognition of a distinction between appearance and reality provides no way to discover reality. I 119
Def Internal realism: our seemingly objective world view should be understood as if it was essentially a creative product of our language and our points of view, the truth of our beliefs is to be understood as their continuation in the context of an ideal development of the corresponding point of view.
Putnam: Def truth is nothing but "idealized rational acceptability". LL.
And as long as "acceptability" means the same as "acceptability for us", the logical gap between thought and the world will disappear.
NagelVsPutnam: The internal realism fails on its own test of rational acceptability. What we actually accept is a worldview which confirms or denies our perceptions. Even our interpretation of quantum theory and the related observations would be a view of the suchness of the world, even if a physicist says it could not be interpreted realistically.
It would not eb a view that would rightly be limited by means of an "internalist" interpretation. Our point of view is a set of beliefs that concern the real suchness, while admitting that there is much we do not know.
The only method for establishing the rational acceptability is to think about whether it is true. I 130 ff_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982