Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Naturalized epistemology: is an expression by W.V. O. Quine (Quine, Willard (2004), "Epistemology Naturalized." In E. Sosa & J. Kim, Epistemology An Anthology, Malden, MA, pp. 292-300). It proposes abandoning traditional epistemology in favor of scientific procedures. The starting point for this consideration is Quine's insight from “Two Dogmas” (Quine, Willard (1994), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism. From a Logical Point of View”, Cambridge, MA pp. 20-46) according to which the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences cannot be traced back to individual present sentences. This is the reason why theories must be considered as a whole. See also analyticity/syntheticity, epistemology._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Barry Stroud on Naturalized Epistemology - Dictionary of Arguments
I 209 Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence. >Epistemology, >Empiricism, >Evidence. There is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. Cf. >Colour researcher Mary. Brains in a vat/Descartes/Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world. >Brains in a vat. I 211 QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory. Solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. Cf. >Naturalism, >Naturalized Epistemology. QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge. >Knowlede/Kant. I 211 Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. >Interior/exterior. I 214 QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. >a priori, >a priori/Quine. I 250 Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/ StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) >"Meager input"/Quine. Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain. - Then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another. -((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) >Underdetermination/Quine. Underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things. Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events. >Knowledge/Quine. I 251 Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy as events. >Indeterminacy, >Events. StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness. >Consciousness. I 253 Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects). >Beliefs, >Knowledge, >World/thinking, >Perception, >Evidence, >W.V.O. Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |