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Possibility, philosophy: something is possible if it cannot be excluded. This has to be distinguished from the concept of contingency that expresses that something could have been different.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ludwig Wittgenstein on Possibility - Dictionary of Arguments

II 31
Possibility/Wittgenstein: we must not say: "A sentence p is possible." If p was not possible, it would not even be a sentence.
II 139
Possibility/Novelty/News/Wittgenstein: we discover new facts, not new possibilities. There is no point asking if red exists. >Existence
, >Existence statements, >Facts, >Sense.
II 167/168
Possibility/Necessity/Realism/Idealism/Wittgenstein: in the arguments of idealists and realists the words "can", "cannot" and "must" always appear somewhere. However, no attempt is made to prove their theories through experience. >Experience, >Necessity.
The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility".
II 228
Possibility/Wittgenstein: we tend to see a possibility as something that exists in nature. "This is possible" here, the real is a certain picture. >Picture.
II 229
For example, "it is potentially present" gives the impression that we have given an explanation that goes beyond the possibility. But in reality, we have only replaced one expression with another.
II 235
Possible/impossible/possibility/meaning/Wittgenstein: this is in a certain sense arbitrary. We say nobody sits in that chair, but someone could be sitting there. That means: the sentence "someone sits on this chair" makes sense.
II 359
Possibility/Wittgenstein: by this we mean logically possible. Where can we look for the phenomenon of possibility? What justifies a symbolism is its usefulness. >Logical possibility.
II 362
Possibility/Assignment/Wittgenstein: the possibility of assignment itself seems to be a kind of assignment.
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IV 19
Thinking/Possibility/Logic/Tractatus: 3.02 What is conceivable is also possible.
3,031 It was said: God could do anything, but nothing that would be contrary to the logical laws. For we could not say what an "illogical world" would look like. >Conceivability/Chalmers.
IV 20
3.032 Something "contrary to logic" cannot be depicted, nor can a figure in geometry whose coordinates contradict the laws of space.
IV 20
Tractatus: 3.13 the sentence includes everything that belongs to projection, but not what is projected.
IV 21
So the possibility of the projected, not this itself.
The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it.
IV 81
Possibility/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.525 It is incorrect to reproduce the sentence "(Ex).fx" as "fx is possible". - Possibility: is expressed by the fact that a sentence makes sense. Impossibility: by the fact that the sentence is a contradiction. >Contradictions.
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VI 113
Possibility/Wittgenstein/Schulte: everything that is possible at all is also legitimate.
Example: Why is "Socrates is Plato" nonsense?
Because we have not made an arbitrary determination, but not because the sign itself is illegitimate. >Use, >Convention.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


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