Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mind Body problem: the question of how thinking and sensibility arise from matter, and how the relationship of the mental and the material without which the mental (psychic, psychical) is not possible can be explained. See also substance, res Cogitans, dualism, monism, identity theory, materialism, physicalism, functionalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hilary Putnam on Mind Body Problem - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 146ff Mind Body Problem/Leib-Seele-Problem/Putnam: you can no longer see the mind body problem as a real theoretical problem. A "solution" would not throw the least light on the world. The identity of logical and structural states of machines is also not important at all - even if everything is accurate, it would only be a discovery about the language. IV 147 Mind Body Problem: it is the question whether or not mental events can be identified with physical events in connection with it. >Identity theory, >Type/Token identity, >Type/Token, >Token-physicalism. Question: can a logical analogue be constructed? Carnap: partially interpreted calculation: machine: state A, when flip-flop circuit 36 is on. Theoretical Language: for the machine: "flip-flop circuit 36 is on." Observation Language: for the machine: "I am in state A". Here, the theoretical language is partially interpreted by the observation language. >Observation language, >Interpretation, cf. >Theoretical term. IV 148 Putnam: thesis: all considerations for or against the identification of body and mind can be parallelized with considerations for or against the finding that state A is actually identical to the flip-flop circuit 36 being on. State A : is directly observable. Flip-flop circuit: the flip-flop circuit can only be determined indirectly via highly complicated conclusions. (1) "synthetic" statement: "I am in state A exactly when the flip-flop circuit is 36 on". (2) also synthetic: "I have pain exactly when my C fibers are irritated." IV 148/149 A synthetic statement cannot have an identity, otherwise it would be analytical. >Analyticity/syntheticity. This traditional argumentation for dualism does not use "bare facts of direct experience" at all, but is a complicated train of thought that includes: a) an objectification of universals (properties, states, events) and b) a sharp analytical/synthetic distinction. >Dualism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf, Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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