Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Copula: a copula is a connection of the subject with a predicate within a sentence or statement. E.g. the sky is blue. The copula is not the same as the "is" of identity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter F. Strawson on Copula - Dictionary of Arguments
I 214 Connective/Relation/Strawson: a) stating connective: (s) is a... b) stated connective: is in relation to..., is an example of... Double-digit expressions are not designations of relations themselves! >Relation. Predicable relations between things not relations themselves. I 215 a) Species universals: provides classification principle, does not presuppose one - E.g. generic name. b) characterizing universals (ch. u.): e.g. verbs, adjectives: provide class. principle only for previously sorted particulars. But also particulars themselves provide the principle of summary: e.g. Socrates as well as wisdom. ->attributive tie: (non-relational connection between particulars of various types). I 216 Example of the characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal dying corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death. I 216 1) Species or Sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2) characterizing tie: e.g. Socrates is wise, is lively, argues - b) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are all wise, all of them die. 3) attributive tie: grouping of particulars because of the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying. Each is a symmetrical form: x is a characterizing tie to y - asymmetrical: x is characterized by y. - Then y dependent member. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: x is asserted to be bound non-relationallly to y i.e. universals of particulars can be predicted, but not by particulars of universals. But even universals can be predicated by universals. >Universals/Strawson. I 221 New/Strawson: distinction between object types instead of word types. I 227f Connective/Bond/Strawson: Special case: between particulars: e.g. the catch which eliminated Compton was made by Carr. Solution: regard is carried out, etc. as quasi-universal. Only quasi-universal: because action and execution of the action are not different. I 229 Nevertheless: a simplification like Compton was eliminated by Carr has a different weighting. Point: we have transferred the role of the subject of a predication to theobjects. >Predication. This is a new criterion as a bridge between the two others._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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