Stuart J. Russell on Superintelligence - Dictionary of Arguments
Brockman I 25
Superintelligence/Stuart Russell: Traditional argumentation: “Human-level or superhuman AI is impossible”(1).
Stuart RussellVsTradition: This is an unusual claim for AI researchers to make, given that, from Turing onward, they have been fending off such claims from philosophers and mathematicians. The claim, which is backed by no evidence, appears to concede that if superintelligent AI were possible, it would be a significant risk.
Brockman I 27
Traditional Defense of strong AI: Any machine intelligent enough to cause trouble will be intelligent enough to have appropriate and altruistic objectives.(2)
Stuart RussellVs: This argument is related to Hume’s is-ought problem and G. E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, suggesting that somehow the machine, as a result of its intelligence, will simply perceive what is right, given its experience of the world. This is implausible; for example, one cannot perceive, in the design of a chessboard and chess pieces, the goal of checkmate; the same chessboard and pieces can be used for suicide chess, or indeed many other games still to be invented.
Traditional Argument against strong AI/VsStrong AI: Intelligence is multidimensional, “so ‘smarter than humans’ is a meaningless concept.”(3)
Stuart RussellVsVs: It is a staple of modern psychology that IQ doesn’t do justice to the full range of cognitive skills that humans possess to varying degrees. IQ is indeed a crude measure of human intelligence, but it is utterly meaningless for current AI systems, because their capabilities across different areas are uncorrelated. How do we compare the IQ of Google’s search engine, which cannot play chess, with that of Deep Blue, which cannot answer search queries? >AI/Stuart Russell.
1. Cf. The AI 100 report (Peter Stone et al.), sponsored by Stanford University, includes the following: “Unlike in the movies, there is no race of superhuman robots on the horizon or probably even possible,” https :1/ai 1 00.stanford.edul 201 6-report.
2. Cf. Rodney Brooks, for example, asserts that it’s impossible for a program to be “smart enough
that it would be able to invent ways to subvert human society to achieve goals set for it by humans, without understanding the ways in which it was causing problems for those same human s,” http ://rodneybrooks.com/the-seven-deadly-sins-of-predicting-the-future-of-ai.
3. Kevin Kelly, “The Myth of a Superhuman AI,” Wired, April 25,2017.
Russell, Stuart J. „The Purpose put into the Machine”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019