Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Connectionism: Connectionism is the theory of neural networks as an explanation for mind states and learning. See also Neural networks, Networks, Learning, Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Neural Networks._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Connectionism - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 199/200 Fodor/LeporeVsConnectionsm: the connectionists draw charts in which the labels (name of the node) say what the intentional interpretation is supposed to be. But no theory explains how the node came to its label. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: Churchland makes the same mistake. This is just semantics by stipulation. It does not matter whether semantics is postulated for points or entire dimensions. IV 201 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. The brain represents red things as red and aunts as aunts (not as objects with certain psychophysical properties). Otherwise we could find out anything with introspection. There are very different interpretations of its charts possible. >Connectionism, >Introspection, >Representation; cf. >Neurophysiology._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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