Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Intuitionism: A) intuitionism in mathematics assumes that the objects to be inspected, e.g. numbers are only constructed in the process of the investigation and are therefore not ready objects, which are discovered. This has an effect on the double negation and the sentence of the excluded middle. B) Intuitionism of ethics assumes that moral principles are fixed and are immediately (or intuitively) knowable. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Intuitionism - Dictionary of Arguments
II 178 Intuitionism: shows us that Truth is not assertibility. X 118 Intuitionism/Quine: one could characterize it as follows: it rejects adjunction if one does not know how to decide which of the subsets is true. Sentence of the excluded middle: we had wanted to protect it via the negation. >Excluded Middle/Quine. Logic/Quine: in reality you cannot make any distinction: once you have changed the relationships between the logical operators ((s) logical constants), you can consider any or all of them as changed. (>Holism). You can tell from that: Adjunction/Negation/Logical Operators/Quine: are inherent, not transcendent. Because with a deviating logic we cannot maintain its meanings. Intuitionism: is therefore not a different opinion about the laws for the operators. He rather fights them as useless for science. QuineVsIntuitionistic Logic: it lacks manageability and familiarity. Their sentence links have no probability function but an intuitive meaning, which we explain with the help of "refute" and "follow from...". However, these explanations become unclear if one wants to maintain the difference between pronouncing a sentence and speaking about the sentence (mention/use)! Quine: then you can also go straight to Heyting's axioms and not interpose a translation, but X 119 apply the direct method of the language teacher. Intuitionism: gained even more impetus through Goedel's proof of incompleteness. QuineVsIntuitionistic Logic: changes the meanings of quantification and constants. Solution: one can proceed constructivistically, but still use the orthodox logic: this is Weyl's constructive set theory. X 121 Ontology/QuineVsIntuitionism/VsIntuitionist Logic: we may not even find what the Intuitionist declares existing. Solution: we have to translate his language into ours first. And not necessarily into our logic, but in our overall language! Then we can say what he sees as existing (in our sense of "exist")._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |