Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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John Locke on Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
McDowell I 126/7 Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: important for him (paralogism-chapter) is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. >Apperception. Euchner I 53f Identity/person/personal identity/Locke: thesis: There is a difference between an arbitrary mass and a structured matter that makes life. We have to distinguish between substance and person, because these are different ideas. >Idea/Locke, >Substance/Locke, >Person/Locke. Def life/Locke: the substance of this trias. Def person/Locke: thinking, intelligent beings with reason, who may consider themselves e - (at different times). >Personal identity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |