Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Object: The object in philosophy is anything that can be thought about or talked about. It can be concrete or abstract, and it is often contrasted with the subject, which is the being that is doing the thinking or talking. See also Subject, Subject-Object Problem, Objects (Material things)._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gottlob Frege on Object - Dictionary of Arguments
II 30 Object/Frege: the object is the meaning of a declarative sentence. It is at the same time the truth value and value curve of a function. >Truth value, >Value propression. (A school-adequate definition of an object is impossible, because it cannot be disassembled - due to its simplicity.) An object is anything that is not a function, i.e. whose expression does not carry an empty space with it. Truth value: A truth value cannot be a part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense, but an object. (truth value/Frege: a truth value is an object) Object/Frege: locations, times, time periods are, logically considered, objects. Consequently, the the linguistic designation of a place or date is to be interpreted as a proper name. Def Object: Something that can never be the whole meaning of a predicate, but the meaning of a subject. >Subject, >Predicate, >Meaning. II 72 "The function f(a)" is not a function (but an object). "The concept F" is not a concept (but an object). I am not saying it is wrong to say about an object what is being said here about a concept, but it is impossible, meaningless, neither false nor true. Existence proposition/existence statement/Frege: e.g. "Julius Caesar exists" is neither true nor false, but meaningless. But: "There is a man named Julius Caesar" has a sense. (A concept is needed.) - - - Brandom I 584 Object/Frege: an object should be the result to which the predicates refer according to the judgement. - - - Frege II 57 Object/Frege: e.g. places, times, time periods - hence their linguistic designations are names. II 74 Concept/object/sentence/Frege: one and the same sentence can be interpreted a) as a statement about a concept, b) about an object. The statements are then different. E.g. the sentence "There is at least one root of 4" cannot be changed into "There is at least one concept for the root of 4." -> concept. - - - I 98 Object/concept/property/Frege: e.g. direction: is an object! - "Same direction as": is a predicate (concept). - - - IV 70/71 Body/Frege: bodies are not in need of completion. (>(s) Objects are saturated). >Saturated/unsaturated._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
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